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We analyse the deficiencies behind the Eastern
Australian gas market by applying a framework pro-
posed by the International Energy Agency. We show
that this gas market has structural weaknesses that
include inadequate supplies at hubs; limited pipeline
capacity; predominance of long‐term gas supply con-
tracts; deficiencies in design; and difficulties with third
party access. We provide five policy actions to help rem-
edy these deficiencies and to help establish a functional
gas market. Although our study is limited to Australia,
it, nevertheless, provides insights for countries in the
Asia Pacific region, which may wish to move towards
more competitive gas markets, including trading hubs.
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642 SHI AND GRAFTON1 | INTRODUCTION
The Eastern Australian gas market encompasses two paradoxes. First, although Australia is
soon to be the largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter in the world, it also has a projected
gas shortfall in 2018 and 2019 in its eastern states (ACCC, 2017). Second, in 2017, the Eastern
Australian wholesale spot gas prices were at record highs when Asian spot gas prices were at
record lows. These paradoxes, in part, are a result of imperfections in the Eastern Australian
gas market.
A key problem in Eastern Australia is a lack of meaningful, market‐based reference prices
for wholesale gas (ACCC, 2016). Although a number of facilitated gas markets have been devel-
oped in Eastern Australia, including the declared wholesale gas market (DWGM) in Victoria
and the short‐term trading market (STTM) hubs in Adelaide, Brisbane, and Sydney, the role
of gas trading markets is limited to mainly managing daily imbalances rather than representing
long‐term market fundamentals (AEMC, 2016a). Although a wholesale gas market was created
in Wallumbilla in Queensland at a node for gas pipelines as early as 2014, there are concerns:
the prices in this market are higher than they would be in a competitive market.
The lack of a competitive and liquid Eastern Australian gas market is puzzling given that
Australia has already established a competitive national electricity market and has a functional
competition environment. A stated vision by the Council of Australian Governments Energy
Council is to establish an efficient and transparent reference gas price. Two comprehensive
reviews on the Eastern Australian gas market by the Australian Energy Market Commission
provide a summary of the status, challenges, and possible pathways of Eastern Australian gas
market (AEMC, 2016a) and the Victorian DWGM (AEMC, 2016b). These studies, and also
reports by Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC, 2016) and Productivity
Commission (2015), offer useful descriptions. Nevertheless, neither of these reports nor the pub-
lished literature (Hay, 2009; Simshauser & Nelson, 2015) provides an analytical framework or
lessons or market insights applicable to other countries.
Here, we investigate possible reasons why the establishment of a competitive and liquid gas
market in the Australian eastern coast remains elusive. To this end, a framework for assessing
gas markets proposed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) is applied. This framework pro-
vides a means to connect the assessment of the Eastern Australian gas market to other locations.
Our study of the Eastern Australian gas market is important because several Asia and Pacific
countries are seeking to establish gas markets where prices are determined by local supply and
demand fundamentals. Indeed, efforts are underway to both liberalise markets and establish gas
trading hubs (IEA, 2013; EIA, 2017; Shi & Variam, 2016). Here, we show the formidable chal-
lenges of establishing a competitive gas market even in an established market economy with
open and competitive energy markets, such as Australia.
Section 2 provides an overview of the Eastern Australian gas market. Section 3 explains the
causes for its deficiencies. Section 4 offers possible measures to establish a functioning gas mar-
kets in Eastern Australia, whereas Section 5 provides concluding remarks.2 | EASTERN AUSTRALIAN GAS MARKET
The Eastern Australian gas market comprises five states (Queensland, New South Wales,
Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania) and the Australian Capital Territory (Figure 1). The
market has three different wholesale gas market trading designs, which are operated by the
FIGURE 1 Eastern Australian gas network.
Source: Modified from Department of Industry (2015, p. 25)
SHI AND GRAFTON 643Australian Energy Markey Operator (AEMO). STTM is located in Adelaide, Brisbane, and
Sydney, the DWGM is located in Victoria, and the gas supply hubs (GSHs) are based at
Wallumbilla in Queensland and Moomba in South Australia.
The DWGM is a virtual hub that covers the Victoria declared transmission system (DTS) and
includes a network of pipelines established in 1999 that transports gas from the fields near
Victoria to meet demand in that area. In the DWGM, capacity is implicitly allocated by AEMO
based on the scheduled quantities, and, thus, gas shippers do not explicitly book capacity to
transport gas within the DTS (AEMC, 2016b). By contrast, in other Australian gas markets,
pipeline capacity is allocated via bilateral arrangements.
The STTM, established in November 2010, is a market for the trading of natural gas at the
wholesale level at defined hubs in Sydney, Adelaide, and Brisbane between pipelines and distribu-
tion systems. It is a market‐based wholesale gas balancing mechanism that facilitates the short‐
term trading of gas and supports retail competition (AEMC, 2016a). Although each of the three
STTM hubs is scheduled and settled separately, all hubs operate under the same rules. Unlike
the DWGM that has intra‐day trades, the STTM market runs once per day, on the day ahead,
and a market price is set each day at each hub. This day‐ahead price (“ex ante market price”) is
applied to all gas that is supplied according to themarket schedules through the hub on the gas day.
The GSHs, which are recent initiatives, are exchanges for the wholesale trading of natural
gas. They provide market participants with an electronic platform to continuously trade
standardised and short‐term physical gas products. The first GSH was inaugurated in May
2014 in Wallumbilla in Queensland, which is close to the gas production centres and facilitates
the marketing of gas to Australia's southern domestic markets and its east coast LNG export
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markets in Queensland, South Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria. It services industrial
gas customers, LNG export facilities, and gas powered generators, thus making it a natural point
of trade and an ideal location for a gas trading exchange (AER, 2017). As a result of AEMO's
optional hub services model in March 2017, the three trading locations at Wallumbilla were
replaced with a single Wallumbilla location. The consolidated single trading location should
improve market liquidity by enabling trading participants across different pipelines to more eas-
ily trade with each other (AEMO, 2017).
The second GSH at Moomba began in June 2016 under the same market framework and
rules as the Wallumbilla GSH (AEMO, 2017). It is a dedicated transit point for gas flowing
between the east coast markets. The Moomba hub is considered an appropriate transitional
measure to provide additional flexibility until trading at the Northern (Wallumbilla) and
Southern (DWGM) hubs, and also pipeline capacity trading, mature. A concern is that the
Moomba hub may dilute the limited trading in the Eastern Australian gas market (AEMC,
2016a) and, thus, may make price discovery more rather than less of a challenge.
Past reports (AEMC, 2016a, 2016b) have concluded that the STTM and DWGM hubs,
despite providing effective and competitive gas balancing services, have not produced
competitive benchmark prices. STTM's balancing function and relative small trading volume
make them unable to represent long‐term market fundamentals of gas supply and demand.
Indeed, as of August 2016, these balancing volumes represented just 5% of Sydney flows,
2% of Brisbane flows, and 6% of Adelaide flows (Energy Quest, 2016). For the Victoria
DWGM, the mandatory usage of it causes a large proportion of gas (which has been locked
in long‐term contracts) to be bid at a zero price ($0/GJ) to ensure guarantee of delivery
(AEMC, 2016b). This is because sellers are required to offer gas according to their long‐term
contracts, whereas the DWGM requires the delivery to be determined by market trading.
Thus, bidding in the lowest allowable (zero) price to guarantee the delivery is practiced by
the DWGM market.
The GSHs do not have representation from important market players, and, thus, their prices
are not necessarily representative of prices paid for gas contracted in large volumes and over
multiple years (AEMC, 2016a). Additionally, the derivatives market that generates forward
curves for price discovery is not yet functional despite of the launching of Wallumbilla Natural
Gas Futures contracts in April 2015. Thus, it uses the Wallumbilla End of Day Benchmark Price
as the reference price (ASX, 2017).3 | DYSFUNCTION IN GAS MARKETS: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT
Our definition of a functional gas market is one in which there is “… a single price zone acces-
sible to incumbents and new entrants on equal terms and where trading is liquid, so that it cre-
ates a reliable price signal in the forward and spot markets which are not distorted” (IEA, 2013,
p. 32). A critical feature of such a market is an exchange with both a spot and futures market
that provide a reliable price signal of market fundamentals. A platform for such an exchange
is commonly referred to as a “hub” where the title or ownership of natural gas is exchanged
between a number of market participants (IEA, 2013).
Here, we apply a framework for assessing a gas market proposed by the IEA. The key factors
in this framework include institutions, structure, and market design (Table 1).






Institutional factors A hands‐off government approach Existing Government
Wholesale price deregulation Existing
Separation of transport and
commercial activities
Not fully functional
Structural factors Sufficient network capacity and
non‐discriminatory access to
networks (TPA)
Both the capacity and








Market design Spot market Existing Competitive
authorityFutures market Yet to be developed
Note. Authors' own classification based on the understanding that this is a basic foundation.
IEA = International Energy Agency; TPA = third party access.
Source: Authors' summary based on IEA, (2013).
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One of the key market conditions that support sport trading and, thus, wholesale market com-
petition is that supply be sufficiently available such that a market price can be established on
the basis of marginal costs. One of the key reasons why European gas markets transition from
oil indexation to hub indexation was because of adequate gas supplies (Heather, 2015; Shi, 2016;
Stern & Rogers, 2011). By contrast, the recent ACCC inquiry projected an Eastern Australian
gas market shortfall of between 55 and 108 PJ in 2018 and between 48 and 102 PJ in 2019
(ACCC, 2017). This suggests that the required supply conditions may not be present in the
Eastern Australia market hubs.3.2 | Pipeline capacity, allocation, and third party access
Given that most pipelines in East Australian gas market are connecting different routes, there is
only limited pipeline‐to‐pipeline competition in the physical hubs. By contrast, as shown in the
United States, the ability to compete and deliver gas through multiple hubs is a critical factor in
their successful market price discovery (EIA, 2017).
An issue also exists in terms of how pipeline capacities are allocated. Other than the DTS,
the Eastern Australian gas market operates under a contract carriage model in which pipeline
users need to purchase primary pipeline capacity rights from pipeline owners through long‐term
contracts. This individual, bilateral negotiation of pipeline capacity raises the barrier for new
producers or gas users to enter the pipeline capacity market, as they may not have the resources
to negotiate on an equal basis with incumbents (AEMC, 2016a).
In addition to a less than effective primary pipeline capacity market, a secondary pipeline
capacity market is not sufficiently advanced to support further gas trades. In other words,
because there is no mandatory relinquishment of unused pipeline capacity, users with firm
capacity rights may have an ability and incentive to “hoard” their capacity in order to limit
646 SHI AND GRAFTONcompetition in their downstream markets (K Lowe Consulting, 2013; The Brattle Group, 2013).
This causes “contractual congestion,” a situation whereby market participants cannot gain
access to contracted but unused pipeline capacity.
Even if contract holders have an incentive to sell capacity in secondary pipeline capacity
markets, there are barriers to the capacity trades, including higher transaction cost and small
size. Due to the small size of Eastern Australia's gas markets (EnergyAustralia, 2013), or a lack
of common delivery points (AGL Energy, 2014), there are very few trades in secondary pipeline
capacity markets.
Third party access (TPA) to pipeline networks has been permitted since the Gas Supply Act
1996 and first implemented by AGL in August 1997 (Abbott & Ma, 2017). Nevertheless, TPA is
not universally applied, and the level of regulation is uneven. Indeed, less than 20% of the trans-
mission pipelines on the east coast are currently subject to any form of regulation (Productivity
Commission, 2015).
Earlier gas market reviews have identified other major challenges that include a lack of
transparent information on the identity of pipeline capacity contract holders, pipeline usage
rates, and the availability and price of capacity in secondary pipeline capacity markets (Grattan
Institute, 2013; Victorian Gas Market Taskforce, 2013). A lack of transparency impedes the entry
of new suppliers, particularly, smaller shippers, into retail markets (ESAA, 2014).3.3 | Market players and price regulation
As the U.S. gas markets illustrates, a successful physical gas hub requires a large number of
buyers and sellers willing to trade and competition between pipeline owners and operators to
provide hub services (FTI Consulting, 2015). By contrast, a small number of large producers
(often in the form of consortia) account for the bulk of gas production and reserves in Eastern
Australia (Productivity Commission, 2015). In the gas transmission sector, ownership in Eastern
Australia is highly concentrated with only two major players (AER, 2013).
A related issue is that a large number of existing pipeline owners have been engaging in
monopolistic pricing, and the ability and incentive to undertake such pricing has not being
effectively constrained by competition (FTI Consulting, 2015). Thus, market power by pipeline
owners has contributed to higher domestic wholesale gas prices than if the market were more
open and competitive (ACCC, 2016). This market contraction and the associated market power
are strengthened by joint venture marketing arrangements and vertical integration (Productivity
Commission, 2015).3.4 | Market designs
The multiple spot markets in the Eastern Australian gas market create complexity, costs, and
inefficiencies, which appear to discourage greater participation of market participants (AEMC,
2016a, 2016b). Indeed, the market currently has three different facilitated market designs and
six different pricing points (hubs). This fragmentation may deter participants in one market
entering another, and registration by participants at only one of the hubs limits their ability
to trade elsewhere (AEMC, 2016a). This fragmentation, coupled with relatively small gas sup-
plies per market, undermines the ability to establish competitive and benchmark hub prices
(AEMC, 2016b). Another problem is that the short‐term trading of gas is limited by a design
framework to procure pipeline capacity at short notice in response to price signals at the hubs
(ACCC, 2016).
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pipeline, prevents liquidity growth because it is not easy to purchase gas from the STTM market
and transfer to other markets due to capacity access and cost of pipeline transportation (AEMC,
2016a). Further, the physical hub design makes the participation of financial participants diffi-
cult and, thus, does not support the development of risk management products (AEMC, 2016a;
Shi, 2016).
In terms of DWGM design, multiple pricing schedules (intra‐day pricing), ancillary pay-
ments, and uplift charges mean that not all of the trading risk is captured in a single commodity
price. For example, the intra‐day rescheduling process in DWGM exposes participants to a num-
ber of different prices across their daily volumes. Further, because the ASX futures contract is
settled daily on the 6 a.m. price, residual risk remains in the form of exposure to the intra‐
day prices if participants change their bids/offers or deviate from their schedule during the
day. In addition, market participants are also exposed to volume risk, which cannot be fully
hedged (AEMC, 2016a). Due to this limitation, it is problematic to develop physical trading
and financial risk management products based on the existing design of the Victorian DWGM.
For the GSHs, the uncertainty for delivery makes the hub less attractive than the STTM
hubs. In the GSHs, the hub operator, AEMO, matches the trades and centrally settles transac-
tions, but unlike the DWGM or STTMs, it does not schedule and manage gas flows or balance
inputs and offtakes on the gas pipelines (AEMC, 2016a).3.5 | Long‐term gas contracts
Australia buyers and sellers appear to prefer long‐term gas contracts rather than hub trading
because, at the wholesale level, the vast majority of trades occur through long‐term bilateral
contracts, with the terms and price kept confidential (ACCC, 2016). In 2016, approximately
80% of gas trading occurred outside of the trading market and were in the form of gas supply
agreements (AEMC, 2016a). Even in the DWGM where usage of the hub is mandatory, market
participants still manage price risk by entering into GSAs outside of the market, and bidding
this gas into the hub to ensure that their short‐term injections and withdrawals match (AEMC,
2016b).4 | TOWARDS A FUNCTIONAL EAST AUSTRALIAN GAS
MARKET
On the basis of the IEA framework, Australia appears to be well positioned towards having a
functional gas market in terms with government leadership in relation to markets, price
deregulation, and spot markets. Progress has also recently been made in terms of gas networks.
Nevertheless, deficiencies remain, as highlighted in Table 1.
Recognising the challenges in establishing a functioning Eastern Australian gas market, the
Australian federal government has undertaken several actions. Plans include improving market
transparency; a Northern Gas Pipeline to transport gas from the Northern Territory to
Queensland; an assessment of further gas pipelines to link Northern and Western Australia
to Eastern Australia; an ACCC inquiry into gas prices, transport, and supply; and a program
to increase community acceptance of gas projects (Grafton, Shi, & Cronshaw, 2018).
The Australian Energy Market Commission is also proposing the establishment of two ref-
erence gas prices, based on a Northern and Southern hub, respectively (AEMC, 2016a). The
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recent introduction of hub services that allow participants to trade compression capacity
(AEMC, 2016a). The proposed Southern Hub would be developed from the existing DWGM
by replacing its current gross pool design with continuous exchange‐based trading, supported
by a system of firm capacity rights (AEMC, 2016b).
Beyond these existing initiatives, additional actions should be considered. First, and fore-
most, an increase in the effective supply for domestic market. The “surplus of supply” condition
was a key catalyst that facilitated the transition from oil indexation to hub competition pricing
in Europe (Heather, 2015; Shi, 2016; Stern & Rogers, 2011). Given there are potentially large vol-
umes of gas in the Northern Territory and in Western Australia that could be directed to Eastern
Australia, additional pipeline connections would augment supply and reduce the market power
of existing gas suppliers in Eastern Australia. Additional supply competition could also be
enhanced by construction of LNG regasification terminals as is also planned by two different
operators (Grafton et al., 2018).
Second, develop an efficient and transparent secondary pipeline market. Easier access to sec-
ondary pipeline capacity for market participants could encourage more efficient responses to
demand and supply imbalances in different parts of the Eastern Australian gas market and also
assist the development of wholesale spot markets (Productivity Commission, 2015). This might
be achieved through regulatory changes such as mandatory relinquishment of unused pipeline
capacity, as well as measures to reduce transaction costs.
Third, promote transparent and efficient TPA. The current regulatory approach should be
strengthened towards a more complete regulation. As for those pipelines under full regulation,
measures need to be taken to prevent some pipeline owners from exercising their market power
(ACCC, 2016). The mandatory and timely reporting of all significant market data can also
increase market transparency. A daily and day‐ahead market for contracted, but un‐nominated
pipeline capacity and hub services, also needs to be developed and introduced into the market
design (AEMC, 2016a).
Fourth, stimulate demand for hub price benchmarks. One possible measure is to provide
additional support for gas spot trading and to create a price benchmark based on hub prices.
The European experience shows that abolishing long‐term contracts create demand for trade
that sustains hub development (Shi, 2016). Such an approach could be supported in Eastern
Australia by regulations that prevent new long‐term contracts.
Fifth, help transform physical hubs to virtual hubs to attract market players. Physical hubs
require large numbers of market players through pipeline‐to‐pipeline competition in the gas
network, which is not yet present in the Eastern Australian market. Consequently, optional
hub services may not be sufficient to produce the expected levels of trading liquidity (AEMC,
2016a). Over the longer term, the Wallumbilla GSH as well as the Moomba GSH, combined
or independently, may need to be further transitioned from a physical hub to a small virtual
hub with a market‐based balancing mechanism consistent in design to recommendations for
the Southern Hub (AEMC, 2016a).5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Eastern Australian gas market is in a state of flux. Wholesale prices are at or close to his-
torical highs, yet there is an inadequate supply and a projected domestic gas shortfall in 2018
and 2019. Much of this turmoil arises from the lack of functioning wholesale gas market to
SHI AND GRAFTON 649generate wholesale gas price benchmark. This is despite the stated intent and focus of the
Australian governments to create such a market.
By applying the IEA framework for hub development, we identify a number of reasons why
a competitive and functional gas market in Eastern Australia has failed to materialise. The key
barriers to a functioning market include insufficient pipeline connections; an inability to allo-
cate or reallocate pipeline capacity; an inadequate number of market players that has, in turn,
allowed for the exercise of market power; and a lack of liquidity in terms of gas volumes because
most domestic demand is supplied via opaque and long‐term gas supply agreements.
We propose that, in addition to existing or planned initiatives, further efforts be undertaken
to increase the effective gas supply; to support an efficient and transparent secondary pipeline
market; to promote transparent and efficient TPA; and to stimulate participation in gas market
hubs to ensure benchmark gas prices that reflect market fundamentals. These initiatives, with
suitable adaptation, may also assist other countries in the Asia and Pacific region who wish
to establish functioning and competitive gas markets.ORCID
Xunpeng (Roc) Shi http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9653-7395
R. Quentin Grafton http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0048-9083REFERENCES
Abbott, M., & Ma, X. (2017). Economic regulation in Australia: The case of the New South Wales gas. Economic
Papers‐A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy, 36(3), 250–265.
ACCC, (2016). Inquiry into the east coast gas market. Canberra: Australian Competition and Consumer Commis-
sion (ACCC). https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/1074_Gas enquiry report_FA_21April.pdf
ACCC, (2017). Gas inquiry 2017–2020 interim report. Canberra. https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/serial‐
publications/gas‐inquiry‐2017‐2020/gas‐inquiry‐september‐2017‐interim‐report
AEMC, (2016a). East coast wholesale gas markets and pipeline frameworks review: Stage 2 final report. Sydney:
Australian Energy Market Commission. http://www.aemc.gov.au/getattachment/576299ec-c361-4a2c-a6cd-
bb45fb834741/Stage-2-Final-Report.aspx
AEMC, (2016b). Review of the Victorian declared wholesale gas market: Draft final report. Sydney: Australian
Energy Market Commission. http://www.aemc.gov.au/getattachment/576299ec‐c361‐4a2c‐a6cd‐bb45fb834741/
Stage‐2‐Final‐Report.aspx
AEMO, (2017). Gas supply hubs. https://www.aemo.com.au/Gas/Gas‐Supply‐Hubs
AER, (2013). State of the energy market 2013. Melbourne. http://www.aer.gov.au/node /23147
AER, (2017). Wallumbilla gas supply hub – On and off market trades. https://www.aer.gov.au/wholesale‐
markets/wholesale‐statistics/wallumbilla‐gas‐supply‐hub‐on‐and‐off‐market‐trades
AGL Energy, (2014). COAG energy council consultation: Enhanced pipeline capacity information. Sydney.
ASX, (2017). Energy derivatives: Natural gas. http://www.asx.com.au/products/energy‐derivatives/natural‐gas.htm
COAG Energy Council, (2014). Australian gas market vision.
Department of Industry, (2015). Gas market report 2015. Canberra: Department of Industry, Innovation and
Science. https://industry.gov.au/Office‐of‐the‐Chief‐Economist/Publications/Pages/Gas‐market‐report.aspx#
EIA, (2017). Perspectives on the development of LNG market hubs in the Asia Pacific region. Washington D.C.:
U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/lng/asia/
Energy Quest, (2016). Energy quarterly August 2016 report.
650 SHI AND GRAFTONEnergyAustralia, (2013). Submission to standing council on energy and resources regulation impact statement –
Gas transmission pipeline capacity trading consultation paper. Melbourne.
ESAA, (2014). Submission to consultation paper on enhanced pipeline capacity information. Melbourne.
FTI Consulting, (2015). Conceptual design for a virtual gas hub(s) for the east coast of Australia. London. http://
www.aemc.gov.au/getattachment/98035b44-a513-4d34-a5a0-9048b7166db3/FTI-Consulting-%E2%80%93-Con
ceptual-design-for-a-virtual-g.aspx
Grafton, R. Q., Shi, X., & Cronshaw, I. (2018). ‘Making cents’ of the Eastern Australian gas market. Economic
Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy, 37(1), 42–54. https://doi.org/10.1111/1759‐3441.12194
Grattan Institute, (2013). Getting gas right: Australia's energy challenge. Melbourne.
Hay, J. L. (2009). Challenges to liberalism: The case of Australian energy policy. Resources Policy, 34(3), 142–149.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.05.001
Heather, P. (2015). The evolution of European traded gas hubs. Oxford: OIES. http://www.oxfordenergy.org/
wpcms/wp‐content/uploads/2015/12/NG‐104.pdf
IEA, (2013). Developing a natural gas trading hub in Asia: Obstacles and opportunities. Paris: International Energy
Agency. https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/AsianGasHub_FINAL_WEB.pdf.
K Lowe Consulting, (2013). Gas market scoping study: A report for the AEMC. Melbourne. http://www.aemc.
gov.au/media/docs/Gas‐Market‐Scoping‐Study‐‐‐K‐Lowe‐Consulting‐Report‐7332de0b‐5c04‐46c5‐82ad‐11bde
42a824e‐0.PDF
Productivity Commission, (2015). Examining barriers to more efficient gas markets. Canberra. Commission
Research Paper. http://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/gas‐markets
Shi, X. (2016). Development of Europe's gas hubs: Implications for East Asia. Natural Gas Industry B, 3(4),
357–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ngib.2016.11.001
Shi, X., & Variam, H. M. P. (2016). Gas and LNG trading hubs, hub indexation and destination flexibility in East
Asia. Energy Policy, 96, 587–596. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.06.032
Simshauser, P., & Nelson, T. (2015). The Australian east coast gas supply cliff. Economic Analysis and Policy, 45,
69–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2015.01.002
Stern, J., & Rogers, H. (2011). The transition to hub‐based gas pricing in continental Europe. Oxford: OIES. http://
www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp‐content/uploads/2011/03/NG49.pdf
The Brattle Group, (2013). International experience in pipeline capacity trading, prepared for AEMO. Rome.
Victorian Gas Market Taskforce, (2013). Gas market taskforce: Final report and recommendations. Melbourne.
The opinions expressed in the Policy Forum are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Journal's Editors and partners.
How to cite this article: Shi X(R), Grafton RQ. Reforming the Eastern Australian gas
market. Asia Pac Policy Stud. 2018;5:641–650. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.244
